

ALS Top-Off Mode Beam Interlock System

Kenneth Baptiste

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Contributors: EI Staff, EM Staff, C. Timossi, H. Mahic.

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory


- **Introduce Top-Off Beam Mode**
 - Why are Interlocks Needed?
 - System Requirements
 - System Specifications
 - Design Principles
- **System Overview**
 - Injection Mode Control & Beam Line Radiation Interlocks
 - Extraction Trigger Inhibit (ETI)
 - Energy Match Intrlk (EMI) & Lattice Match Intrlk (LMI)
 - Stored Beam Intrlk (SBI)
 - Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) roles
- **Commissioning & Testing**
 - Configuration Control
 - Testing
- **System Operation**
 - Timeline & Recent History
- **Conclusion**

Decay Mode: ■

Refills every ~8 hrs with Safety Shutters **closed**, ID gaps open

Top-Off Mode: ■

Refills every ~30 sec with Safety Shutters **open**, ID gaps nominal




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
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
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
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
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Typical Beam Operation

Injection Line

Booster Ring

Storage Ring

Beam Line

Potentially Dangerous Condition

Top-Off Injection


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Typical Beam Operation



Top-Off Injection

- **Injected Beam Losses:** Radiation Transport code was used to determine a point inside the shielding where the electron beam could be allowed to impact and still be safe to personnel outside of the shielding.


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
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Typical Beam Operation



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
- **Injected Beam Losses:** Radiation Transport code was used to determine a point inside the shielding where the electron beam could be allowed to impact and still be safe to personnel outside of the shielding.
- **Non-Injected Beam Losses:** RF Trips, Beam Scrappers, Vacuum

Simulations were conducted using:

- Reverse Tracking Method
- Abnormal and Failure Scenarios
 - Human Missettings
 - Feedback Systems
 - Power Supply Trips
 - Shorts in Magnet
 - etc.,
- Energy Scanning
- Magnet Current/Field Scanning
- Apertures
- Alignment Tolerances
- etc.,

Analysis was done to determine:

- The shortest time to reach a potentially dangerous condition.
- Included effects: vacuum chamber, power supply & magnet



Injected Beam Losses - 3 Systems of Intrlks:

- Energy Match Intrlk (EMI)
- Lattice Match Intrlk (LMI)
- Stored Beam Intrlk (SBI)
- Apertures

} Injection Intrlks & Mode Control
Extraction Trigger Inhibit (ETI)

Requirements include both Value & Time Response

Provided by
Physics Group

Power Supply	Intrlk System	F. S. Output (A)	Nominal Current (A)	Intrlk Accuracy $\pm\%$ of Nominal	Max Response Time (ms)	Intrlk Value (A)	Intrlk +/- Limits % of Nominal
BR Bend	EMI	1050	982	0.1%	1	981.55	+0.268, -0.201
SR Bend	EMI	1000	897	0.1%	1	896.82	+0.374, -0.348
SR4, 8, 12 Super- Bends	EMI	350	298	0.1%	1	298.5 298.6 298.46	+0.297, -0.284
SR QFA	LMI	550	492	0.1%	1	492.349	+0.519, -0.433
SR4, 8, 12 QFAs (Super-Bend)	LMI	550	521	0.1%	1	521.387	+0.64, -0.45
SR SF	LMI	400	373	10%	1	372.87	+2.77, -46.6
SR SD	LMI	400	250	10%	1	250.02	+24.5, -35.5
SR Beam (BPM)	SBI	1000 mA	500 mA	1%	1	500 mA	+120.0, >2.5

Non-Injected Beam Losses:

- Radiation Monitors

Requirements include both Value & Time Response


Radiation Monitor	Intrlk System	Slow Integration Time (hr)	Intrlk Value (mRem)	Fast Integration Time (s)	Intrlk Value (mRem)	Loss of Counts Timeout (s)
HPI 6031 w/6012 controller	BL	1	5.0	4.0 w/60s delay	10.0	30

System Design Principles:

- Fail-safe
- Redundant (parallel)
- Testable
- Visible
- Self-checking – increase reliability

Technologies:

- Solid-state devices – hardware intrlk to meet Time Response
- Solid-state Radiation Monitors
- Commercial PLC's
- Electro-mechanical relays – existing Radiation Safety System ⁶



Injection Mode Intrlk & Control:

- Electromechanical, redundant, failsafe
- **Fill Mode** (Transfer Line Magnets Enabled, PSS closed)
- **Stored Beam Mode** (Transfer Line Magnets Disabled, PSS open)
- **Top-Off Mode** (start in Fill Mode, Stored Beam, Admin Key turned)
 - If NO Radiation Monitor Trips or ETI Faults
 - Permit PSS open
 - Extraction Triggers are Enabled if, LMI, EMI, & Rad Mon OK or PSS closed




Radiation Beam Line Monitors:

- Solid-state & Electromechanical, Failsafe (low-level source)
- Radiation Monitor Trip compared with PSS position status
- Radiation Monitors are Reset Locally
- Annual Test & Calibration



Functions Implemented in FPGA :

- Intrlk'd Trigger Control
- Self-Checking & Monitoring
- Test




Top Off
Interlock
Systems




Interlock Control Signals

J. Weber, et al., "ALS FPGA-Based Extraction Trigger Inhibit Interlock System for Top-Off Mode," these proceedings Poster ID: FR5REP031




Components :

- DC Current Transducers
- Comparator Based Intrlk
- Optically Isolated Current Loop Intrlk
- Networked PLC I/O (Digital & Analog)




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
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
- Beam Position Monitor Buttons in Sum Mode
- Narrow Band 500MHz Detection
- Bunch Pattern Independent
- Simple, Mostly Passive – High Reliability



Embedded PLC (Intrlk System Management)

- CsCAN to I/O, ModBus Slave (serial)
- Configuration Authorization (key & password)
- For each Magnet System & Current Loop Intrlk

CsCAN To I/O



Embedded PLC
Register Map


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➤ **System Fault**

DAC-ADC Match Fail
Network I/O Status

CsCAN To I/O



**Embedded PLC
Register Map**

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 - **Top-Off Intrlk Management**
 - PCB Jumper Configuration Confirmation
 - Configuration Intrlk Set Point & Window V

CsCAN To I/O



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- User Interface

CsCAN To I/O



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
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- User Interface
- Register Space for Gateway PLC Read/Write

CsCAN To I/O



Embedded PLC
Register Map



WE4GRC06

- **User Interface**




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Gateway PLC (Control System Interface)

- User Interface
- ModBus Master to Embedded PLC (serial)




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Gateway PLC (Control System Interface)

- User Interface
- ModBus Master to Embedded PLC (serial)
- ModBus Slave to EPICS (TCP/IP)




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- User Interface
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Gateway PLC (Control System Interface)

- User Interface
- ModBus Master to Embedded PLC (serial)
- ModBus Slave to EPICS (TCP/IP)
- Heartbeat for EPICS




Embedded PLC (Intrik System Management)

- CsCAN to I/O, ModBus Slave (serial)
- Configuration Authorization (**key & password**)
- For each Magnet System & Current Loop Intrik
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Gateway PLC (Control System Interface)

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- ModBus Master to Embedded PLC (serial)
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- Heartbeat for EPICS
- Register Space for EPICS Read/Write




Commissioning


- Board-Level Bench Testing Prior to Installation
- PLC Programming – Many Problems with CAN Network
- Configuration & Control (**procedure based**)
 - Hardware, Software & Firmware
 - Intrlk SP, UL & LL Intrlk Thresholds
 - PCB Jumper Setting

System Testing (procedure based)


- Intrlk Window (static & ramped magnets, beam)
 - ➔ Small incremental $\pm$ changes in Magnet I
- Intrlk Time Response
 - ➔ Large neg step change in Magnet I ($\geq 10\%$) to minimize uncertainty in Time Measurement
 - ➔ Substituted Hi-Freq square-wave for magnet trig.



BR Bend Energy Gates



Hi-Freq Sq-Wave Terminated



Project Timeline

- Design – Reviewed – Installed: (10/07 – 08/08)
- Debugging – Commissioning: (09/08 – 11/08)
- ALS Top-Off Mode Testing: (11/08 – 02/09)

User Beam Top-Off Operation (02/09 – present)

Top-Off Beam Interlock Statistics

- Failures: ETI – relay, EMI – PLC I/O modules, fuse
- System Faults: Failures, Op Error, DAC-ADC Match, Self-Check Timing, RSS Test Procedure
- Interlock Trips: System Faults, Mag PS trips, Mis-settings, Temperature

System Design

- Extensive Physics Simulations
- Conservative Margins on Intrlk Settings - **Increased Radiation Safety**

Commissioning & Testing

- Problematic CAN Networking – **Fixed**
- Reset (Trips & Faults) – **Fixed**
- Self-Checking Timeout Sys Fault when using 50kHz sq-wave test signal for Time Response Test – **Fixed**
- Periodic Re-Test – **Labor Intensive**

System Operation

- Complicated – **Need more Training & Automation**
- ALS Beam Reliability – **Remained Constant**
- Exceeding our Expectations – **Users Very Happy!**

Improvements

- Automate the Intrlk System's Resets – **Eliminate Op Introduced Faults**
- Automate Periodic Re-Test

1. D. Robin, et al, "PLAN TO UPGRADE THE ADVANCED LIGHT SOURCE TO TOP-OFF INJECTION OPERATION" EPAC04, pg. 2442.
2. H. Nishimura, *et al.*, "BEAM LOSS SIMULATION STUDIES FOR ALS TOP-OFF OPERATION" PAC05, pg. 3532
3. H. Nishimura, *et al.*, "ALS TOP-OFF SIMULATION STUDIES FOR RADIATION SAFETY" PAC07, pg. 1173
4. H. Nishimura, *et al.*, "Advanced Light Source's Approach to Ensure Conditions for Safe Top-off, Operation" NIM (submitted 2009).
5. J. Weber, et al., "ALS FPGA-Based Extraction Trigger Inhibit Interlock System for Top-Off Mode," these proceedings Poster ID: FR5REP031

Thank You